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Black v. Littlejohn: A New Discovery Formula for
Non-apparent Injuries Under the Professional
Malpractice Statute of Limitations
Under the discovery rule a cause of action accrues and the statute of limita-
tions begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover,
facts giving rise to the claim.' Difficulties arise, however, in the application of
this rule. Some courts have held that the plaintiff need only discover the injury
to trigger the statute of limitations.2 Other courts have stated that the limitation
period will not begin until the plaintiff discovers the connection between the
injury and the defendant's conduct.3 Finally, some courts have held that even
when injury and causation are known, the statute will not begin to run until the
plaintiff becomes aware that the defendant's conduct was wrongful or
negligent. 4
1. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 126 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Cause of action
accrues "when a diligent plaintiff has knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on notice of an inva-
sion of his legal rights."); Dawson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 543 F. Supp. 1330, 1333 (D.D.C. 1982) ("[Tihe
cause of action accrues for limitations purposes... when plaintiff [discovers], or by the exercise of
due diligence should have discovered, the facts giving rise to her claim."); Christ v. Lipsitz, 99 Cal.
App. 3d 894, 898, 160 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501 (1979) ("The statute begins to run when the plaintiff has
notice of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry .... "); Flippin v. Jarrell, 301
N.C. 108, 118, 270 S.E.2d 482, 489 (1980) ("Periods of limitation, by definition, are those periods
which begin running upon accrual of the claim."), reh'g denied, 301 N.C. 727, 274 S.E.2d 228
(1981). For a general discussion of the discovery rule, see I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE § 13.07 (1984) [hereinafter cited as LOUISELL & WILLIAMS].
2. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 393 F. Supp 387 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (statute of limita-
tions began to run against plaintiff's decedent on date of automobile accident rather than when car
was manufactured or sold), aff'd without opinion, 538 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1976); Christ v. Lipsitz, 99
Cal. App. 3d 894, 160 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1979) (limitation period began to run when wife of a suppos-
edly sterile man became pregnant and not on date of negligently performed vasectomy); Gray v.
Reeves, 76 Cal. App. 3d 567, 142 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1977) (plaintiff's recovery barred by discovery
more than one year before commencement of suit that damage to hip was due to drug treatment);
Kelton v. District of Columbia, 413 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1980) (statute began to run against plaintiff
when told that a tubal ligation had been performed on her during a Caesarean section delivery and
not when ligation was performed). For additional cases that require only that injury be shown to
start the running of the limitation period, see LOuIsELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 13.07, at 13-22
n.52.
3. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S, 111 (1979) (statute of limitations contained in Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act began running when veteran suffered loss of hearing and was informed that a
previously administered antibiotic had caused the loss); Grigsby v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 428 F. Supp.
242 (D.D.C. 1975) (statute started running once plaintiff was told that defendant's drug possibly
caused plaintiff's deafness), aff'd without opinion, 543 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 967 (1977); Johnson v. Podger, 43 N.C. App. 20, 257 S.E.2d 684 (statute of limitations started
running when plaintiff was informed that infection was result of earlier hysterectomy), cert. denied,
298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 920 (1979). For additional cases that discuss the necessary elements of
injury and causation, see LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note I, § 13.07, at 13-23 n.53.
4. See Dawson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 543 F. Supp. 1330 (D.D.C. 1982) (plaintiff's claim did not
accrue for limitations purposes until discovery that defendant had marketed diethylstilbestrol with-
out adequate testing); Jacoby v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 622 P.2d 613 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981) (statute
of limitations commenced running when plaintiff discovered negligence of defendants in grafting
arteries); Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill. 2d 146, 421 N.E.2d 869 (1981) (statute started to run against
plaintiff when she discovered that defendants were negligent in prescribing Ortho-Novum for her).
For additional cases requiring that the plaintiff discover the negligence of the defendant in addition
to injury and causation, see LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 13.07, at 13-24 n.54.
In Black v. Littlejohn 5 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the
issue whether the statute of limitations had run against a plaintiff who knew that
her reproductive organs had been removed as the result of defendant's surgery,
but who did not discover until more than two years later that the surgery was
unnecessary. 6 Speaking for a unanimous court,7 Justice Frye wrote that a le-
gally recognizable injury did not exist until the plaintiff discovered defendant's
wrongful conduct.8 Therefore, plaintiff's surgery qualified as a non-apparent
injury within the meaning of the applicable medical malpractice statute of limi-
tations.9 Because plaintiff's injury "was not readily apparent until her subse-
quent discovery of defendant's wrongful conduct,"' 0 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in dismissing her cause of
action, which she had filed within one year after the discovery and within the
bounds of the four-year period of repose.1 '
This Note discusses the conflicting policies that underlie statutes of limita-
tions 12 and analyzes the supreme court's opinion in Black v. Littlejohn in light of
these policies.' 3 It concludes that the court was correct in interpreting discovery
of injury to include discovery of defendant's negligent or wrongful conduct. 14
In March 1976, Sharon Black began experiencing menstrual problems.' 5
She consulted Dr. Thomas Littlejohn, Sr., a specialist in obstetrics and gynecol-
ogy who diagnosed her condition as endometriosis. 16 On June 29, 1978, Dr.
5. 312 N.C. 626, 325 S.E.2d 469 (1985).
6. Id. at 642, 325 S.E.2d at 480.
7. Justice Vaughn did not participate in the decision. He had previously considered the case
in the court of appeals and had concurred in the holding the supreme court reversed. Black v.
Littlejohn, 67 N.C. App. 211, 214, 312 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1984), rev'd, 312 N.C. 626, 325 S.E.2d 469
(1985).
8. Black, 312 N.C. at 646, 325 S.E.2d at 482.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983). The pertinent language of the statute states:
(c) Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action for malpractice
arising out of the performance of or failure to perform professional services shall be
deemed to accrue at the time of the occurrence of the last act of the defendant giving rise to
the cause of action: Provided that whenever there is bodily injury to the person ... which
originates under circumstances making the injury... not readily apparent to the claimant
at the time of its origin, and the injury... is discovered or should reasonably be discovered
by the claimant two or more years after the occurrence of the last act of the defendant
giving rise to the cause of action, suit must be commenced within one year from the date
discovery is made: Provided nothing herein shall be construed to reduce the statute of
limitation in any such case below three years. Provided further, that in no event shall an
action be commenced more than four years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to
the cause of action: Provided further, that where damages are sought by reason of a for-
eign object, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, having been left in the
body, a person seeking damages for malpractice may commence an action therefor within
one year after discovery thereof as hereinabove provided, but in no event may the action be
commenced more than 10 years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause
of action.
Id.
10. Black, 312 N.C. at 646, 325 S.E.2d at 482.
11. Id. at 647, 325 S.E.2d at 483.
12. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 69-141 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
15. Record at 9, Black (plaintiff's affidavit).
16. Id. Endometriosis is a common disorder in which the membrane lining of the inner surface
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Littlejohn told Ms. Black that "the only way to get rid of this endometrosis [sic]
and to get permanent relief was by hysterectomy.' 7 Dr. Littlejohn never rec-
ommended any drug treatments, yet he told Ms. Black that "he had done every-
thing he could to avoid a hysterectomy and that nothing else would work."' 8
On October 1, 1978, Dr. Littlejohn performed a total abdominal hysterec-
tomy on the plaintiff, as well as a bilateral salpingo oophorectomy, and an ap-
pendectomy accompanied by lysis of adhesions.' 9 On August 17, 1981, Ms.
Black, a medical secretary, transferred to a new job unit. After the transfer, Ms.
Black began to see medical charts of patients suffering from endometriosis who
were being effectively treated with the drug Danocrine.20 She was informed by
two doctors that her surgery "might have been unnecessary. '2 1 This informa-
tion led Ms. Black to suspect that Danocrine treatments should have been tried
in her case before resorting to surgery. 22 Ms. Black continued to suffer from
endometriosis until July 1982 when another physician began to treat her with
Danocrine.2 3 She called the Food and Drug Administration and learned that
the drug had been available to physicians as of September 1976.24 At this time
Ms. Black stated that it became "completely apparent to me that my hysterec-
tomy was unnecessary." '25
On August 16, 1982, Sharon Black initiated a medical malpractice action
against Dr. Littlejohn.26 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
of the uterus spreads to abnormal locations such as the "uterine wall, ovaries, or extragenital sites."
THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1669 (R. Berkow 14th ed. 1982).
17. Record at 9, Black (plaintiff's affidavit).
18. Id.; see also Black, 312 N.C. at 627, 325 S.E.2d at 471 (quoting defendant's statement to
plaintiff).
19. Black, 312 N.C. at 626, 325 S.E.2d at 471. An abdominal hysterectomy involves removal
of the uterus through an incision in the abdominal wall. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY 700 (14th ed. 1981). A bilateral salpingo oophorectomy is the removal of both ovaries and
fallopian tubes. Id. at 1270. An appendectomy is removal of the appendix, id. at 111, and lysis of
adhesions entails the removal of fibrous scar tissue to prevent the tissue from adhering to other
surfaces, id. at 35, 845.
20. Record at 10, Black (plaintiff's affidavit). Danocrine is a type of steroid that prevents the
spread of endometriosis and also reduces the patient's discomfort by causing atrophy of the endome-
trial tissue. L. GOVONI & J. HAYES, DRUGS AND NURSING IMPLICATIONS 295 (4th ed. 1982).
21. Record at 10, Black (plaintiff's affidavit); see also Black, 312 N.C. at 627, 325 S.E.2d at 471
(quoting plaintiff in her affidavit).
22. Record at 10, Black (plaintiff's affidavit); see also Black, 312 N.C. at 627, 325 S.E.2d at 471
(quoting plaintiff in her affidavit).
23. Black, 312 N.C. at 627, 325 S.E.2d at 471.
24. Id.
25. Record at 10, Black (plaintiff's affidavit); see also Black, 312 N.C. at 627, 325 S.E.2d at 471
(quoting plaintiff in her affidavit).
26. Black, 312 N.C. at 627, 325 S.E.2d at 471. Plaintiffdid not file her complaint until Septem-
ber 3, 1982. Record at 2, Black. On August 16, 1982, plaintiff obtained an order extending the time
to file a complaint until September 5, 1982. Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 2, Black. Had the
order not been granted, plaintiff may have been barred even under the supreme court's interpretation
of injury requiring discovery of defendant's wrongful conduct. As the court of appeals noted, "per-
haps as early as 17 August 1981, plaintiff contends that she began to suspect that her medical condi-
tion could have been treated without surgery, and that defendant had negligently failed to advise her
of alternative, less drastic treatments." Black v. Littlejohn, 67 N.C. App. 211, 211-12, 312 S.E.2d
909, 910 (1984), rep'd, 312 N.C. 626, 325 S.E.2d 469 (1985). Plaintiff commenced the action one day
short of the running of the statute.
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12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,2 7 on the grounds that
the professional malpractice statute of limitations barred the action.28 The trial
court granted the motion and a divided court of appeals affirmed. 29 The court of
appeals held that plaintiff's injury was "the unnecessary surgery and the re-
moval of her ovaries and other reproductive organs."'30 Therefore, plaintiff did
not suffer a latent injury, in which "there is bodily injury to the person ... which
originates under circumstances making the injury... not readily apparent to the
claimant at the time of its origin."' 31 Because the court classified plaintiff's in-
jury as an apparent injury which constituted "the last act of the defendant giving
rise to the cause of action," 32 the three-year statute of limitations33 began to run
on the date of surgery. 34 Therefore, the discovery exceptions contained in sec-
tion 1-15(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes, which would have tolled
the statute until plaintiff discovered her injury, did not apply and plaintiff was
barred by the three-year statute of limitations. 35
The court of appeals acknowledged that plaintiff did not discover the de-
fendant's negligence in failing to advise her of alternative treatments until Au-
gust 17, 1981.36 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the purpose behind the
four year exception found in section 1-15(c) was "to provide for latent injuries
where the physical damage to a prospective plaintiff is not readily apparent, and
not for those cases in which the injury is obvious but the alleged negligence of
the doctor is not." 37 The court concluded that "[w]e do not believe our legisla-
ture intended to equate the discovery of injury with discovery of negligence."'38
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, recognizing that under the
statute of limitations in section 1-15(c), "[tlhe pivotal language for purposes of
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1 (1983). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to
dismiss a pleading for "[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." N.C.R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983); see supra note 9.
29. Black, 67 N.C. App. at 214, 312 S.E.2d at 911. Judge Johnson dissented. Id. at 214, 312
S.E.2d at 912. For a discussion of the dissent, see infra note 38.
30. Id. at 213, 312 S.E.2d at 911.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983); see supra note 9 for the text of the statute.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983); see supra note 9 for the text of the statute.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5) (1983).
34. Black, 67 N.C. App. at 213, 312 S.E.2d at 911.
35. Id. Section 1-52(5) provides a three-year statute of limitations "for any other injury to the
person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not hereinafter enumerated." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-52(5) (1983).
36. Black, 67 N.C. App. at 213, 312 S.E.2d at 911.
37. Id.
38. Id. Judge Johnson filed a lengthy dissent. Id. at 214, 312 S.E.2d at 912. He rejected the
majority's interpretation of injury as "the submission to unnecessary surgery," id. at 218, 312 S.E.2d
at 914, and argued for the adoption of the legal injury test, id. at 222, 312 S.E.2d at 916. Under this
test
a patient must file the action within one year from the time the patient discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, both the fact of damage or
injury suffered and facts leading to the realization that the cause was or may have been her
physician's negligence. In other words, discovery-actual or presumptive-of all the es-
sential elements of a malpractice cause of action.
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this appeal is the term 'injury.' "39 The supreme court rejected the court of
appeals' narrow interpretation of injury as a "latent injury where physical dam-
age is not readily apparent." 4° Instead, the court defined injury as "bodily in-
jury resulting from wrongful conduct in the legal sense."'4 1 Thus, Black's injury
was "the wrong entitling plaintiff to commence a cause of action. Until plaintiff
discovers the wrongful conduct of defendant, she is unaware that she has been
injured in the legal sense." 42
Under the supreme court's interpretation, plaintiff suffered a non-apparent
bodily injury because, even though she was aware of the surgery, she was una-
ware of defendant's wrongful conduct. Thus, the court applied the longer dis-
covery statute of limitations, applicable to non-apparent injuries, instead of the
shorter statute of limitations for apparent injuries. Because plaintiff's discovery
of defendant's negligence occurred "two or more years after the occurence of the
last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action," 4 3 the statute granted
her "one year from the date discovery is made"44 to file a claim, provided "that
in no event shall an action be commenced more than four years from the last act
of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action."145 The supreme court con-
cluded that "[s]ince plaintiff timely filed her complaint within one year after
discovering defendant's wrongful conduct or negligence, well within the four-
year outer limit, her cause of action should not be dismissed."'4 6
Under the supreme court's definition of legal injury in Black, three ele-
ments must be present to trigger the statute of limitations in section 1-15(c).
39. Black, 312 N.C. at 638, 325 S.E.2d at 477.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 646, 325 S.E.2d at 483 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 639, 325 S.E.2d at 478. The supreme court thus adopted the legal injury test Judge
Johnson urged in his dissent. See supra note 38. Judge Johnson believed that the legal injury test
was particularly appropriate in lack of informed consent cases. Black, 67 N.C. App. at 217, 312
S.E.2d at 913. Plaintiff did not contend "that defendant performed the operation negligently." Id.
at 215-16, 312 S.E.2d at 912. In this case, "[ihe legally protected interest invaded by defendant was
plaintiff's right to be adequately informed about the treatments available for her condition prior to
giving consent to the recommended surgery." Id. at 219, 312 S.E.2d at 914. In an informed consent
case, the injury
does not actually manifest itself in a physically objective and ascertainable manner ....
Such an "injury" manifests itself in the knowledge or awareness that it was not necessary to
consent to surgery because another less drastic treatment was available. Until the plaintiff
learned of the alternative treatment, her injury was not apparent to her.
Id. at 218, 312 S.E.2d at 914. Under this view, plaintiff's loss of her reproductive organs was only a
consequential injury attributable to defendant's malpractice in failing to advise her adequately about
available alternative treatments. Id.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983). The defendant's last act "giving rise to the cause of
action" was the October 1, 1978, surgery. Plaintiff's discovery occurred, at the earliest, on August
17, 1981, approximately two years and ten months later, when she changed jobs. Black, 312 N.C. at
628, 325 S.E.2d at 472.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983). Plaintiff's discovery occurred on August 17, 1981. She
began her action on August 16, 1982, one day before the end of the discovery period. Black, 312
N.C. at 628, 325 S.E.2d at 472. See supra note 26.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983). Because the last act of defendant was the October 1,
1978, surgery, the absolute four year limit provided by the statute was October 1, 1982. Plaintiff
came within this period by commencing her action on August 16, 1982. Black, 312 N.C. at 629, 325
S.E.2d at 472. For a discussion of these absolute time limits or periods of repose, see infra note 63,
46. Black, 312 N.C. at 647, 325 S.E.2d at 483.
First, the plaintiff must become aware of the injury.47 Second, the plaintiff must
realize the cause of the injury.4 8 Last, the plaintiff must discover that the de-
fendant's conduct was possibly wrongful or negligent.49
The court identified five reasons to support its adoption of the legal injury
test. First, it claimed that this interpretation best conformed to the purpose and
spirit of section 1-15(c) in light of the history and circumstances that surrounded
its enactment. 50 Second, the court noted that the legislative history justified in-
terpreting the statute to include a legal injury test.5 1 Third, the court found
support in various rules of statutory construction that guide the interpretation of
ambiguous language. 52 Fourth, the court examined how other jurisdictions
have interpreted "injury" in the discovery provisions of their statutes and noted
that injury is generally defined as a breach of a duty.53 Last, the court recog-
nized that the considerations of fairness and equity that underlie the discovery
provisions conflict with an interpretation of "injury" that allows the statute of
limitations to run against a plaintiff who does not have enough information to
bring suit.5 4
Several policy considerations underlie the enactment of statutes of limita-
tions. Statutes of limitations protect a defendant from stale or fraudulent claims
"by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared." 55 In addition, statutes of limitations protect the courts from hav-
ing to adjudicate stale claims that otherwise would undermine their efficiency
and effectiveness. 56 Finally, statutes of limitations provide an incentive to po-
tential plaintiffs not to sleep on their rights but to investigate and file timely
claims.57
47. Id. at 645, 325 S.E.2d at 482 ("The plaintiff in the instant case ... was well aware of her
injury (if injury in a purely physical sense were the intended meaning).").
48. Id. ("Plaintiff knew that the removal of her reproductive organs was caused by the defend-
ant's performance of surgery ....").
49. Id. ("m[]he one-year-from-discovery provision in G.S. 1-15(c) can and should be interpreted
to include an awareness by plaintiff that wrongful or negligent conduct was involved.").
50. Id. at 634, 325 S.E.2d at 477; see infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
51. Black, 312 N.C. at 635-36, 325 S.E.2d at 476; see infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
52. Black, 312 N.C. at 638-39, 325 S.E.2d at 478; see infra notes 91-109 and accompanying
text.
53. Black, 312 N.C. at 639-43, 325 S.E.2d at 478-80; see infra notes 110-24 and accompanying
text.
54. Black, 312 N.C. at 643-45, 325 S.E.2d at 480-82; see infra notes 125-41 and accompanying
text.
55. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944). Morgan v.
Grace Hosp. Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965), demonstrates the inherent problems of
stale claims. On January 16, 1953, a physician employed by defendant performed a hysterectomy on
plaintiff and failed to remove a sponge. On April 13, 1963, another physician discovered the sponge
by means of an X-ray. Id. at 784, 144 S.E.2d at 157. The dissent noted that by the time plaintiff
began her action, "the doctor who performed the operation and who presumably knows more about
plaintiff's injury than any other person has long since removed from this State and his testimony as a
material witness is unavailable to the defendant." Id. at 795, 144 S.E.2d at 163 (Haymond, J.,
dissenting).
56. See Note, Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1185
& nn.89-90 (1950) (noting that this concern for efficiency often appears in the conflicts of laws area).
57. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 123 (1979):
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In direct opposition to these policy considerations is an injured party's right
to seek relief in the courts for an injury.58 Therefore, all statutes of limitations
must "strike a delicate balance between the rights of the diligent plaintiff who
should not be barred from pursuing a meritorious claim and the defendant who
deserves protection from stale claims after a viable defense may be weakened
because of dead witnesses or forgotten facts."5 9
The court's interpretation of the professional malpractice statute of limita-
tions was "[ihe heart of the controversy" in Black.60 North Carolina General
Statutes section 1-15(c) applies to three types of injuries. First, the section refers
to apparent injuries, which plaintiff must discover or reasonably should discover
within three years "of the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of
action."'61 For apparent injuries, "the last act of the defendant" marks the date
on which the statute begins to run, 62 and the plaintiff must commence suit
within three years. 63 A second type of injury covered by section 1-15(c) is the
A plaintiff ... armed with the facts about the harm done to him, can protect himself by
seeking advice in the medical and legal community. To excuse him from promptly doing
so by postponing the accrual of his claim would undermine the purpose of the limitations
statute, which is to require the reasonably diligent presentation of tort claims ....
58. Black, 312 N.C. at 634, 325 S.E.2d at 475; see also Note, Medical Malpractice Statute of
Repos" An Unconstitutional Denial of Access to the Courts, 63 NEB. L. REV. 150, 163 (1983) (dis-
cussing the strong public policy in favor of giving an injured person access to the courts).
59. Black, 312 N.C. at 635, 325 S.E.2d at 476; see also Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274, 300
A.2d 563, 567 (1973) ("[I]n each case ... equitable claims of opposing parties must be identified,
evaluated, and weighed. Where, as is often the case, they cannot be wholly reconciled, a just accom-
modation must be reached .... The interplay of the conflicting interests of the competing parties
must be considered.").
60. Black, 312 N.C. at 628, 325 S.E.2d at 472.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983); see supra note 9. For apparent injury examples, see
Sullivan v. McGraw, 118 Mich. 39, 76 N.W. 149 (1898) (plaintiff entered hospital for surgery on
right leg but defendant operated on left); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 516, 104 N.W. 12 (1905)
(plaintiff underwent surgery for the right ear but defendant operated on left).
62. Stanley v. Brown, 43 N.C. App. 503, 259 S.E.2d 408 (1979), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 332, 265
S.E.2d 397 (1980). The defendant in Stanley performed an operation on plaintiff's vagina on Febru-
ary 27, 1974. Plaintiff stated in her affidavit that within several days of her return home, she ex-
amined herself in the mirror and noticed a bulging condition known as "pooched intestines." Id.
The court held that under § 1-15(c) "the action accrues at the time of defendant's last act giving rise
to the cause of action. In this case the action accrued on 27 February 1974, the date defendant
performed the operation on the plaintiff." Id. at 506, 259 S.E.2d at 410.
63. See Black, 312 N.C. at 629, 325 S.E.2d at 472 (under holding that plaintiff suffered an
apparent injury, she was brought "within the three-year limitation period contained in the first pro-
vision of G.S. 1-15(c)."); Stanley v. Brown, 43 N.C. App. 503, 259 S.E.2d 408 (1979) (plaintiff
suffering from apparent injury barred from recovery for failure to file within the three-year statutory
period), cert denied, 299 N.C. 332, 265 S.E.2d 397 (1980).
Historically, statutes of repose have been considered equivalent to statutes of limitation. See
Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 129, 321 N.W.2d 913, 916 (1982) ("It has long been the rule of this
state that a statute of limitations is a statute of repose designed to prevent recovery on stale
claims."); Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 370, 98 S.E.2d 508, 514 (1957) ("Statutes of limitations
are inflexible and unyielding. They operate inexorably without reference to the merits of plaintiff's
cause of action. They are statutes of repose, intended to require that litigation be initiated within the
prescribed time or not at all."). Modem cases, however, have distinguished between the two stat-
utes. "Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon accrual of the claim ...
the period contained in the statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of
whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted." Black, 312 N.C. at 633,
325 S.E.2d at 474-75 (emphasis added); see also Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364,
366, 293 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1982) ("Such statutes [of repose] are intended to be 'a substantive defini-
tion of rights as distinguished from a procedural limitation on the remedy used to enforce rights.' ")
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non-apparent injury.64 Section 1-15(c) provides an additional one year from
time of discovery provision for non-apparent injuries 65 subject to a four year
period of repose.6 6 The third type of injury covered by section 1-15(c) involves
"a foreign object, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, hav-
ing been left in the body." 67 Foreign object injuries, like non-apparent injuries,
(quoting Stevenson, Products Liability and the Virginia Statute of Ltmitations-A Call for the Legis-
lative Rescue Squad, 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 323, 334 n.38 (1982)).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983) ("bodily injury to the person... which originates under
circumstances making the injury... not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin").
For the full text of the statute see supra note 9. For examples of non-apparent injuries see Lopez v.
Swyer, 62 NJ. 267, 271, 300 A.2d 563, 565 (1973) (Negligence of radiologist undiscovered until
plaintiff overheard another physician state, "And there you see, gentlemen, what happens when the
radiologist puts a patient on the table and goes out and has a cup of coffee."); Teeters v. Currey, 518
S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974) (negligent bilateral tubal ligation undiscovered until plaintiff became
pregnant).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983); see Black, 312 N.C. at 634, 325 S.E.2d at 475 (§ 15(c)
contains "an additional one-year-from-discovery period for injuries 'not readily apparent' ") (quot-
ing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c)).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983) ("n[ln no event shall an action be commenced more than
four years from the last act of defendant giving rise to the cause of action .... ").
A question left unanswered by § 1-15(c) is whether a foreign object injury must also be a non-
apparent injury. Clearly, the statute and the courts consider them to be separate and distinct catego-
ries. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983); Black, 312 N.C. at 637, 325 S.E.2d at 477 ("the General
Assembly ... [included] separate discovery provisions for both non-apparent injury and foreign
objects"); Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 112, 270 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1980) ("[Flor latent claims
discovered two or more years after the defendant's last negligent act, except those involving a...
'foreign object' left in the body, the statute established a four-year period of limitation .... "). There
is an assumption that foreign object injuries are always non-apparent. See, e.g., Shearin v. Lloyd,
246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957) (physician left lap-pack in patient after surgery on appendix).
This assumption may not always be valid. A patient who has a pacemaker unnecessarily implanted
into the chest clearly has a "foreign object, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect
... left in the body." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983). Under the legal injury test adopted by
Black, the patient has ten years to discover that the doctor was negligent in placing the unessential
object into the chest cavity. On the other hand, when a patient has all of her reproductive organs
unnecessarily removed, the statute provides only four years in which to discover the defendant's
negligence. The difference does not seem to justify the statutory distinction.
The constitutionality of North Carolina General Statutes § 1-15(c) has been upheld. In Roberts
v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 533, 289 S.E.2d 875 (1982), ajJ'd, 307 N.C. 465, 298
S.E.2d 384 (1983), the court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the
particular defendants in the case, a doctor and a hospital. Id. at 537, 289 S.E.2d at 878. Despite the
fact plaintiffs had no standing, the court found that under the rational basis test, § 1-15(c) did not
violate the equal protection clause of the federal constitution ("No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNSr. amend. XIV, § 1), nor the
exclusive emoluments clause of the state constitution ("No person ... is entitled to exclusive or
separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services."
N.C. CONsT. Art. I, § 32). Id. at 541, 289 S.E.2d at 880. In Walker v. Santos, 70 N.C. App. 623,
320 S.E.2d 407 (1984), the court of appeals summarily rejected a challenge to § 1-15(c) under the
open courts provision of the state constitution, which provides that, "[a]ll courts shall be open; every
person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due
course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial or delay." N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 18. For a general discussion of the constitutionality of statutes of repose, see Mc-
Govern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM.
U.L. REV. 579 (1981); Note, Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose: An Unconstitutional Denial of
Access to the Courts, 63 NEB. L. REv. 150 (1983). For a discussion of how North Carolina courts
have viewed the constitutionality of statutes of repose, see Note, Repose for Manufacturers'Six Year
Statutory Bar to Products Liability Actions Upheld-Tetterton v. Long Manufacturing Co., 64
N.C.L. REv. 1157 (1986); Note, Wilder v. Amatex Corp.: A First Step Toward Ameliorating The
Effect of Statutes of Repose on Plaintiffs with Delayed Manifestation Diseases, 64 N.C.L. REv. 416
(1986).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983). For the text of the statute, see supra note 9. For exam-
ples of foreign object injuries, see Wilder v. St. Joseph Hosp., 225 Miss. 42, 82 So. 2d 651 (1955)
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have an additional one year from time of discovery provision. Unlike non-ap-
parent injuries, however, foreign object injuries are subject to a ten year period
of repose. 68
The Black court stressed the purpose underlying the medical malpractice
statute of limitations as a first justification for applying the legal injury test to
the non-apparent injury discovery provision.69 To determine that purpose, the
court looked to the history of the statute and to the circumstances surrounding
its enactment.
The court noted that prior to legislative adoption of the discovery rule,
North Carolina courts followed the general rule that a cause of action arises on
the date of defendant's negligent act.70 Lack of actual or substantial damage
and lack of knowledge of injury by the plaintiff were irrelevant. 71 Because of the
(action against defendants for leaving gauze, sponges, and other substances in plaintiff after hystercc-
tomy); Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957) (lap-pack left in abdomen of plaintiff
after appendectomy performed by defendant).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983) ("a person seeking damages . . . may commence an
action therefor within one year after discovery thereof ... but in no event may an action be com-
menced more than 10 years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action"),
For the text of the statute, see supra note 9.
69. Black, 312 N.C. at 630-37, 325 S.E.2d at 473-77; see also Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737,
739 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[lt is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to
make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or
object to accomplish .. "), afid, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
70. Black, 312 at 630-31 & n.1, 325 S.E.2d at 473 & n.1. This interpretation of when a cause of
action accrues has been called the time-of-wrongful-act rule, or the occurrence rule. See LOUISELL
& WILLIAMS, supra note I, § 13.06 (discussing the rule, stating the reasons given for its use, noting
the injustice that often results from its application, and examining the various doctrines that amelio-
rate its application); Ellis, Malpractice Accrual: Adherence to the Common Law in Professional Neg-
ligence Actions, 19 IDAiio L. Rav. 63 (1983) (discussing the origin of the occurrence rule, its
development, and the current trend away from it).
The courts also have interpreted "accrual" in other ways. The termination of treatment rule
holds that the cause of action accrues at the termination of a course of treatment. When plaintiff
receives only one treatment, the rule operates like the occurrence rule. However, when plaintiff
undergoes a prolonged treatment and the time of the negligent act is uncertain, the cause of action
arises only when the physician ceases that specific treatment. See LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra
note 1, § 13.08, at 13-32 & n.81. The North Carolina Court of Appeals expressly adopted this rule
in Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 59, 247 S.E.2d 287, 294 (1978). The court did note the
general rule, however, that if the plaintiff discovers the injury during the treatment, the statute will
run from the earlier date of discovery. Id. at 60, 247 S.E.2d at 294.
Under the termination of relation rule, the cause of action accrues at the end of the doctor-
patient relationship. Usually this occurs when the patient recovers, when the patient is referred to
another physician for treatment, or when the physician is dismissed. This interpretation may extend
liability far beyond the date on which the doctor performed the negligent act. See LOUIsELL &
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 13.09, at 13-37. This rule was rejected in Ballenger, 38 N.C. App. at 56,
247 S.E.2d at 292.
71. See Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 367, 98 S.E.2d 508, 511 (1957) (statute begins to run
despite absence of damage or knowledge of injury); Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 512, 73 S.E.2d
320, 322 (1952) (statute begins to run despite plaintiff's lack of knowledge of injury). In Shearin the
physician left a "lap-pack" in plaintiff's abdomen during an appendectomy. The court held that
"plaintiff's cause of action accrued... immediately upon the closing of the incision." Shearin, 246
N.C. at 370, 98 S.E.2d at 513. Plaintiff in Lewis entered the hospital to have a cyst removed from
one of her ovaries. Without informing plaintiff, defendant completely removed an ovary and tied off
her fallopian tubes. After consulting various doctors about her inability to have children, plaintiff
discovered what defendant had done. Lewis, 236 N.C. at 511, 73 S.E.2d at 321. The court held that
"lack of knowledge on the part of plaintiff does not suspend the statute" and therefore she was
barred from recovery. Id. at 512-13, 73 S.E.2d at 322.
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harsh results that often arose from application of the rule,72 and because of the
courts' refusal to mitigate or modify the rule,73 the general assembly enacted
North Carolina General Statutes section 1-15(b) in 1971,74 allowing application
of a discovery rule to non-apparent injuries caused by a physician's medical mal-
practice. 75 Under the new law, "a plaintiff had three years from the date of
discovery to bring suit, with an outside time limit of ten years."'76 In 1975,
however, the general assembly amended section 1-15(b) to exclude from its cov-
erage "malpractice arising out of the performance of or failure to perform pro-
fessional services."' 77 At the same time, the general assembly enacted North
Carolina General Statutes section 1-15(c), a statute applicable only to profes-
sional malpractice actions. 78 The new statute reduced the discovery rule to a
requirement that the plaintiff commence suit within one year after the discovery
of his or her injury, with a four year period of repose for non-apparent injuries
and a ten year period of repose for foreign object injuries.7 9
Whereas the purpose of section 1-15(b) "was to enlarge, [and] not to restrict
the time within which an action for damages could be brought,"8 0 the intent of
section 1-15(c) was "to decrease the number and severity of medical malpractice
claims in an effort to decrease the cost of medical malpractice insurance." 8' The
Black court noted that this historical counterbalancing demonstrated a legisla-
tive effort to reach a compromise between "the needs of the malpractice victims
and those of health care providers and insurers."'8 2
The court next examined the circumstances that surrounded enactment of
section 1-15(c). The court noted that the medical profession was caught in a
72. See supra note 71.
73. See, eg., Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 370-71, 98 S.E.2d 508, 514 (1957).
It is not for us to justify the limitation period prescribed for actions such as this....
Suffice to say, this is a matter within the province of the General Assembly.
In some instances, [the statute] may operate to bar the maintenance of meritorious
causes of action. When confronted with such a cause, the urge is strong to write into the
statute exceptions that do not appear therein. In such case, we must bear in mind Lord
Campbell's caution: "Hard cases must not make bad law." [citations omitted].
Id.
74. Act of July 21, 1971, cl. 1157, §§ 1-2, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1706, 1706, repealed by Act of
May 28, 1979, ch. 654, § 3(a), 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687, 689.
75. See Raftery v. William C. Vick Constr. Co., 291 N.C. 180, 188, 230 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1976);
Johnson v. Podger, 43 N.C. App. 20, 22-23, 257 S.E.2d 684, 687, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261
S.E.2d 920 (1979).
76. Roberts v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 533, 535, 289 S.E.2d 875, 877
(1982), affid, 307 N.C. 465, 298 S.E.2d 384 (1983). The "outside time limit" is the period of repose.
See supra note 63.
77. Medical Malpractice Act, ch. 977, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 3, repealed by Act of May
28, 1979, ch. 654, § 3(a), 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687, 689.
78. Medical Malpractice Act, ch. 977, § 2, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 3-4 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983)). For the text of the statute, see supra note 9. In 1979 the general assembly
repealed § 1-15(b). Act of May 28, 1979, ch. 654, § 3(a), 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687. 689. This
repeal had no effect on § 1-15(c). See Black, 312 N.C. at 632 n.2, 325 S.E.2d at 474 n.2.
79. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
80. Raftery v. William C. Vick Constr. Co., 291 N.C. 180, 189, 230 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1976).
81. Black, 312 N.C. at 633, 325 S.E.2d at 475.
82. Id. at 637, 325 S.E.2d at 477.
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nationwide crisis "that revolved around the exorbitant cost of medical malprac-
tice insurance and the dramatic increase in medical malpractice claims."'83 In
North Carolina a study commission was appointed to examine the situation and
make recommendations to the general assembly.84 After holding public hear-
ings and considering the available options, the commission made its report.8 5
The Black court found one recommendation especially noteworthy. The com-
missioners urged that the period of repose for all professional malpractice inju-
ries be reduced to four years.86 The general assembly, however, rejected this
proposal and retained the ten year period of repose for foreign object injuries.87
The general assembly also rejected the commission's recommendation to include
only one discovery provision in section 1-15(c). 88 The Black court reasoned that
this action demonstrated "an intent on the part of the general assembly to pre-
serve the plaintiff's cause of action in medical malpractice cases, particularly
when the defendant's wrongdoing is not known to plaintiff at the time of defend-
ant's last act," 89 and to give claimants "the maximum opportunity in delayed
discovery situations to pursue their cause of action subject to the outer time
limits in the statute."90 According to the court, these specific acts by the general
assembly, in direct contradiction to the commission's recommendations, justified
a liberal interpretation of "injury."
After examining the legislative history of the statute, the court turned to the
language of the statute. Applying technical rules of statutory construction, the
court found a third basis of support for its position that discovery of injury re-
quires discovery of wrongful conduct.9 1
83. Id. at 631, 325 S.E.2d at 474. For a discussion of various legislative responses to the medi-
cal malpractice insurance crisis during the seventies, see Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis. Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REv. 759 (1977); Comment,
An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417.
For a discussion of the North Carolina General Assembly's reaction, see Byrd, The North Carolina
Medical Malpractice Statute, 62 N.C.L. REv. 711 (1984).
84. The house ordered the Commission "to make a thorough and comprehensive study on any
and all aspects of professional liability insurance." Act of June 16, 1975, ch. 623, § 1, 1975 N.C.
Sess. Laws 749, 749. The senate specifically requested an examination of the statute of limitations.
Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 861, § 1(1), 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1227, 1227.
85. NORTH CAROLINA PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1976 [hereinafter cited as INSURANCE STUDY]. See also Black,
312 N.C. at 631-32, 325 S.E.2d at 474 (summarizing the findings and recommendations of the com-
mission); Roberts v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 533, 540-41, 289 S.E.2d 875, 879
(1982) (discussion of insurance company threats to withdraw from state unless granted an 82% rate
increase and allowed to change policy forms), affd, 307 N.C. 465, 298 S.E.2d 384 (1983).
86. INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 85, at 28. See Black, 312 N.C. at 631, 325 S.E.2d at 474
("the most significant recommendation made was to lower the outside time limit to four years for
actions based on professional malpractice").
87. See supra note 9.
88. See supra note 9.
89. Black, 312 N.C. at 635-36, 325 S.E.2d at 476.
90. Id. at 637, 325 S.E.2d at 477.
91. For discussions of various methods and rules of statutory construction, see G. CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing that courts should be able to "re-
peal" outdated statutes and substitute a more modem rule); Dittoe, Statutory Revision by Common
Law Courts and the Nature of Legislative Decision Making-A Response to Professor Calabresi, 28
ST. Louis U.LJ. 235 (1984) (criticizing Professor Calabresi's proposal as an intrusion on the law-
making power of legislatures); Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Con-
stitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1982) (arguing that an economic analysis of law, stressing how
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The court first recited the general rule that "words of a statute will be given
their natural, approved, and recognized meaning" 92 and noted that a dictionary
may be helpful in this regard. 93 The court then stated what it deemed the most
suitable meaning of injury: "'a violation of another's rights... an actionable
wrong.' ,,94 Thus, plaintiff in Black suffered no injury within the meaning of the
statute until she discovered defendant's violation of her rights.95
The court's analysis, however, is flawed. The ordinary meaning of a word
in a statute should be used only when the word has no legal or technical signifi-
cance. 96 The two cases cited by the court, In re Appeal of Martin97 and State v.
Martin,98 demonstrate this principle. In re Appeal of Martin involved the inter-
pretation of the word "transshipment" as used in a property taxation statute. In
defining the word, the court stated the general rule that "[o]rdinarily, words of a
statute will be given their natural, approved, and recognized meaning.... How-
ever, when technical terms or terms of art are used in a statute they are pre-
sumed to have been used with their technical meaning in mind, absent a
legislative intent to the contrary." 99 The court applied the ordinary meaning
rule only after finding no technical or special meaning.10 0 State v. Martin con-
cerned an interpretation of a state wildlife resources commission rule making it
unlawful "to snag fish." 10 1 Only after noting that "snag" had no legal signifi-
cance did the court apply the ordinary meaning rule.'0 2 The Black court clearly
acknowledged that "[w]ithin the legal field, the term injury does indeed possess
legal significance and is considered to be a term of art." 10 3 Thus, the court
should have looked to the legal or technical definition, not the ordinary defini-
tion, of the word "injury."
The court cured its flawed analysis, however, by applying a second rule of
statutory construction: "'when technical terms or terms of art are used in a
statute they are presumed to have been used with their technical meaning in
mind.' "04 This technical meaning should have priority over other interpreta-
tions, including the "ordinary meaning" construction.10 5 A court also may pre-
sume that when an expression has historical legal significance, the "'legislators
interest groups seek to have wealth reallocated in their favor, is not incompatible with traditional
methods of interpretation); Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Con-
gressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982) (discussing the judicial reluctance to
interpret legislative silence, the reasons for the reluctance, and suggesting that in some situations it
may be necessary).
92. Black, 312 N.C. at 638, 325 S.E.2d at 478.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting WEBsTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1164 (1971)).
95. Id.
96. Lafayette Transp. Serv., Inc. v. County of Robeson, 283 N.C. 494, 196 S.E.2d 770 (1973).
97. 286 N.C. 66, 209 S.E.2d 766 (1974).
98. 7 N.C. App. 532, 173 S.E.2d 47 (1970).
99. In re Appeal of Martin, 286 N.C. at 77-78, 209 S.E.2d at 774 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 78, 209 S.E.2d at 774.
101. Martin, 7 N.C. App. at 533, 173 S.E.2d at 48.
102. Id.
103. Black, 312 N.C. at 639, 325 S.E.2d at 478.
104. Id. (quoting In re Appeal of Martin, 286 N.C. at 77-78, 209 S.E.2d at 774).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 96-103.
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intended the same significance to attach by use of that term . . . ",106 The
Black court recognized that the legal community historically has defined an in-
jury as "the invasion of any legally protected interest of another" 10 7 rather than
"an act that damages, harms, or hurts." 108 Under this interpretation, the Black
court noted that plaintiff's injury derived from defendant's wrongful invasion of
her rights. Thus, until she discovered defendant's wrongful conduct her injury
was non-apparent within the meaning of section 1-15(c). 10 9
The Black court next examined how courts in other jurisdictions have con-
strued the discovery provisions in their statutes of limitations. One line of au-
thority requires that a plaintiff need only discover two facts to trigger the
statute: a physical injury and a causal relationship between that physical injury
and defendant's conduct. For example, in United States v. Kubrick"t the
United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act discovery
provision "' requires only that a plaintiff become "aware of his injury and its
probable cause" 112 to trigger the statute.
That he has been injured in fact may be unknown or unknowable until
the injury manifests itself, and the facts about causation may be in the
control of the putative defendant, unavailable to the plaintiff or at least
very difficult to obtain. The prospect is not so bleak for a plaintiff in
possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has in-
flicted the injury. He is no longer at the mercy of the latter. There are
others who can tell him if he has been wronged, and he need only
ask. 113
Courts that adhere to this rule emphasize the general purpose of statutes of
106. Black, 312 N.C. at 639, 325 S.E.2d at 478 (quoting Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
302 N.C. 403, 427, 276 S.E.2d 422, 437 (1981)). Sheffield involved an interpretation of the term
"tender offer" under the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
107. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) & comment a (1965); see also Christ v.
Lipsitz, 99 Cal. App. 3d 894, 897, 160 Cal. Rptr. 498, 500 (1979) ("The word 'injury' in the statute
includes not only the physical condition but also the negligent cause of the condition.").
108. WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1164 (1971).
109. Black, 312 N.C. at 639, 325 S.E.2d at 478. The Black court adopted the definition that
"injury is legal injury is legal wrong is malpractice is cause of action is negligence." Jacoby v. Kaiser
Found. Hosp., 622 P.2d 613, 617 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981).
110. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
111. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that "A tort claim against the United States shall be
forever barred unless it is presented... within two years after such claim accrues ...." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401(b) (1982).
112. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 118.
113. Id. at 122. Kubrick has been severely criticized for two reasons. First, it imposes a duty on
the injured party to "protect himself by seeking advice in the medical and legal community."
Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123. The court of appeals in Black also adopted this view, noting that "through
the use of reasonable diligence [plaintiff] could have obtained a second medical opinion .... ." Black,
67 N.C. App. at 213, 312 S.E.2d at 911. This affirmative duty was rejected by the North Carolina
Supreme Court. The fiduciary relationship between the parties grants a patient the right to rely on
the physician's knowledge and skill. Black, 312 N.C. at 646, 325 S.E.2d 482. The Kubrick position
only "penalizes the patient who has full confidence in his or her doctor and serves to promote an
atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust." Black, 67 N.C. App. at 217, 312 S.E.2d at 913 (John-
son, J., dissenting). This position also fails to recognize the conspiracy of silence that often prevents
even a diligent plaintiff from obtaining the true facts. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 128 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (responding to the majority's assumption that plaintiff can obtain medical information
from another doctor: "I am not at all sure about those odds."). Defendant in Black never asserted
that plaintiff had a duty to investigate. Indeed, on appeal, defendant claimed that the language was
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limitations-the prevention of stale claims. 114 When foreign objects are in-
volved, the damaging evidence is preserved within the patient's body. With non-
apparent injuries, however, the evidentiary problems become acute with the pas-
sage of time. Material witnesses disappear and memories grow dim. Further-
more, because the medical field experiences rapid advancements in technology
and knowledge, the physician may be forced to defend against a standard that
did not exist at the time of the injury.1 15 The statute also involves economic and
public health interests in protecting the medical profession from unreasonable
claims. Increasing liability may force physicians to leave the state or stop prac-
ticing altogether. 116 The Kubrick court took note of these arguments and as-
serted that the statute of limitations itself serves "as a 'meritorious defense, in
itself serving a public interest.' ",117
These arguments, however, are inapplicable to Black. Unlike the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 118 North Carolina General Statutes section 1-15(c) contains
absolute time limits of four years for non-apparent injuries and ten years for
foreign object injuries. 119 Thus, a physician will not be held liable indefi-
nitely. 120 Furthermore, section 1-15(c) does not require actual discovery by the
plaintiff. The statutory period will be triggered if the injury "should reasonably
be discovered" by the injured party.121 The plaintiff bears the burden of plead-
ing the date of the discovery, the relevant factors involving the discovery, and
mere dicta, "not central to the court's holding nor necessary to the decision reached." Defendant-
Appellee's New Brief at 10.
A second criticism of the Kubrick test is that it undermines the policy of avoiding needless and
spurious litigation because it forces an injured person to file a claim only to prevent the statute of
limitations from running. See Thorpe v. DeMent, 69 N.C. App. 355, 365, 317 S.E.2d 692, 698
(Phillips, J., dissenting) ("Public interest requires that people be able to know what they are about
and why before they take their grievances to court or even have a right to."), aff'd, 312 N.C. 488,
322 S.E.2d 777 (1984); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979) (noting that the Kubrick
view is inconsistent with the general rule opposing filing of unfounded claims). Thus, the Kubrick
test of injury undermines the very purpose of § 1-15(c)-the prevention of unjustified and costly
claims against the medical profession. See supra text accompanying note 81.
114. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
115. See Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases, 36 A.D.2d 31, 33, 319 N.Y.S.2d 674, 677
(1971) ("[D]efendants may be put in the position of resisting claims arising out of new technology or
advances in medical knowledge which have taken place since the time of treatment.").
116. The North Carolina Professional Liability Insurance Study Commission noted that under a
longer period of liability, the insurance companies would be required to establish larger reserves.
This in turn would increase the amount of premiums physicians must pay. INSURANCE STUDY,
supra note 85, at 4-5.
117. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136
(1938)).
118. See supra note 111.
119. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
120. A second major difference distinguishes Black from Kubrick. The Federal Tort Claims Act
includes a waiver of governmental immunity that must be strictly construed. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at
117-18; see also Lincoln Constr. Co. v. Department of Admin., 3 N.C. App. 551, 165 S.E.2d 338
(1969) (statute permitting state agency to be sued must be strictly construed). In Black governmen-
tal immunity was not an issue.
121. See supra note 9. The Black court, however, specifically rejected imposing a duty on the
plaintiff to seek a second medical opinion. See supra note 113; see also Christ v. Lipsitz, 99 Cal. App.
3d 894, 160 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1979) (plaintiff discovered negligent vasectomy upon pregnancy of wife
rather than birth of child); Lutes v. Farley, 113 IM. App. 3d 113, 446 N.E.2d 866 (1983) (plaintiff
held to have discovered injury at stillbirth of child, not when later informed of defendant's possible
negligence).
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the circumstances that establish a reasonable delay in discovery.122 Thus, the
evidentiary problems that are often cited by the courts to justify their position
that discovery of wrongdoing does not equate with discovery of injury were not
present in Black. Indisputably, plaintiff had her reproductive organs removed
by defendant. Therefore, the concern for lost or inaccurate evidence is not pres-
ent. Because of these considerations, the North Carolina Supreme Court
adopted the interpretation of injury used in the "better reasoned cases" 123 and
held that discovery of defendant's wrongdoing is required before the statute of
limitations begins to run.124
The final reason the North Carolina Supreme Court gave to support its
holding in Black was a rule of fairness. The court noted that it is inherently
unjust to interpret "injury" in a manner that requires the filing of a claim before
the plaintiff possesses enough information upon which to base that claim. 125
One of the policies underlying the discovery rule is fairness to the plaintiff.
Therefore, the discovery provision should be interpreted in a manner that fur-
thers that policy. This goal can be achieved only through a broad interpretation
of injury-defining the word injury in the legal sense.126
In examining the fairness rule, the court discussed Dawson v. Eli Lilly &
Co. 127 In Dawson a federal district court analyzed and applied the fairness rule
and identified three fact situations that commonly require application of the
rule. The first arises when a plaintiff is unaware of the physical injury. The
second arises when the plaintiff is aware of the harm but is unaware of its source.
The final fact pattern arises when the plaintiff is aware of the injury and its cause
but is unaware of any wrongful conduct. 128 The Black court noted that the
third pattern fit the facts in Black.129 After analyzing the reasoning in Daw-
son,' 30 the supreme court concluded that, under the fairness rule, there was no
reason to restrict the definition of injury to only the first two situations. 131
Additional arguments have been made in support of the fairness rule. Inju-
ries caused by medical malpractice often remain hidden for lengthy periods of
122. Christ v. Lipsitz, 99 Cal. App. 3d 894, 898, 160 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501 (1979). When the
plaintiff should have reasonably discovered the injury is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Id.;
see also Jacoby v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 622 P.2d 613 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981) (when discovery of
negligent arterial graft occurred and whether plaintiff was reasonably diligent in the discovery is
question for jury); Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 247 S.E.2d 287 (1978) (when plaintiff
became aware of unnecessary narcotic treatment is question for jury); Anderson v. Shook, 333
N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1983) (discovery date of doctor's negligent radiation treatment is issue of fact).
123. Black, 312 N.C. at 640, 325 S.E.2d at 479.
124. Id. at 642, 325 S.E.2d at 480.
125. Id. at 643, 325 S.E.2d at 480.
126. See id. at 645, 325 S.E.2d at 482; see also Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825
(1980) (statute providing discovery rule only for foreign object injuries is unconstitutional violation
of equal protection clause); Brown v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hosp., 117 N.H. 739, 378 A.2d
1138 (1977) (rule of fairness requires that plaintiff be given a reasonable opportunity to discover
injury).
127. 543 F. Supp. 1330 (D.D.C. 1982).
128. Id. at 1338.
129. Black, 312 N.C. at 645, 325 S.E.2d at 482.
130. Id. at 643-45, 325 S.E.2d at 480-82.
131. Id. at 645, 325 S.E.2d at 482. For a discussion of the three situations and examples of each,
see supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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time. 132 Even when the patient experiences discomfort, he or she often assumes
the annoyance to be a part of the healing process-a side effect that must be
tolerated. 133 Courts are naturally reluctant to hold a patient who possesses no
medical knowledge responsible for discovering an injury based on the wrongful
conduct of a physician.134 It has been stated that "the nature of the tort itself
and the character of the injury will frequently prevent knowledge of what is
wrong, so that the plaintiff is forced to rely upon what he is told by the physician
or surgeon."' 135
The fairness rule is supported not only by considerations of fairness to the
individual plaintiff, but by broader policy reasons as well. Fairness to society
requires that an interpretation of injury comport with basic principles of public
policy. The major purpose of section 1-15(c) is to prevent unjustified and costly
claims against the medical profession. 136 An interpretation of the statute that
fails to require discovery of defendant's wrongful conduct would encourage the
filing of lawsuits to prevent the statute of limitations from running.' 37 Further-
more, if the statute of limitations is deemed to run before an injured party dis-
covers the wrongful conduct of the physician, the temptation would exist for the
physician to avoid disclosure instead of attempting to correct the problem and
control the damage. 13 8 Broadening the rule to include discovery of negligence
also reduces fraudulent concealment claims frequently filed by the injured party
to avoid being barred by the statute of limitations.139 This in turn decreases the
number of issues the court must address and protects the reputation of the de-
fendant "from reckless and indiscriminate charges of dishonorable conduct.' ' 14
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 899 comment e, at 444 (1979).
133. Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979).
134. See Dawson, 543 F. Supp. at 1337 ("[lany courts have assumed that a person who has
reacted adversely to medical treatment... cannot be expected to know that wrongful conduct, and
thus a possible cause of action, is involved .... "); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979)
("when injuries are suffered that have been caused by an unknown act of negligence by an expert, the
law ought not ... destroy a right of action before a person even becomes aware of the existence of
that right").
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 899 comment e, at 444 (1979).
136. See supra text accompanying note 81.
137. See supra note 113.
138. See Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979).
139. Under the fraudulent concealment rule, the statute of limitations will be tolled if the physi-
cian engages in a deliberate attempt to conceal the patient's cause of action, thereby inducing a
postponement in filing suit. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 13.11 (discussing the rule in
general, the burden of proof borne by the plaintiff, and the types of conduct held to constitute fraud-
ulent concealment).
140. Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 518 (Tenn. 1974). In a majority of jurisdictions, the
statute of limitations is tolled if the physician has fraudulently concealed facts from the injured
party. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 13.11, at 13-43. The North Carolina statute,
however, does not contain such a provision. See supra note 9. It is unclear whether the North
Carolina courts would extend the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action for fraudu-
lent concealment. See Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 369, 98 S.E.2d 508, 513 (1957) ("[W]e need
not consider the circumstances under which a defendant's fraudulent concealment of material facts
would toll the running of the statute of limitations."); Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 513, 73 S.E.2d
320, 322 (1952) ("Whether the fraudulent concealment of the facts by the tort-feasor constitutes an
implied exception to the statute, notwithstanding its express language, we need not now decide
."). But cf Troy's Stereo Center, Inc. v. Hodson, 39 N.C. App. 591, 251 S.E.2d 673 (1979)
(doctrine of equitable estoppel may prevent defendant from asserting statute of limitations defense in
legal malpractice suit).
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Finally, statutes of limitations act as an incentive to potential plaintiffs to file
prompt claims. This policy, however, is inapplicable to a plaintiff unaware of
any basis for the claim. 141 One can hardly be accused of sleeping on rights that
one does not know exist.
In 1984 the court of appeals stated that in North Carolina "[t]he judicial
fiction that damage and loss occur and causes of action therefore accrue when
negligence happens rather than when injury .,. is learned about leads to many
anomalous and even pernicious results and it would be a great service to the law
of this state if the Supreme Court abandoned it .... -142 In 1985 the supreme
court took that step by adopting an interpretation of injury in medical malprac-
tice cases that includes discovery of misconduct.
Prior to 1985, the discovery provision for non-apparent injuries contained
within section 1-15(c) was as useful to an injured patient as a butter-knife to a
surgeon. In Black the North Carolina Supreme Court sharpened it into a scal-
pel. Like a scalpel, however, its use will be rare. In most cases, discovery of
injury, causation, and misconduct occur simultaneously. Situations in which the
patient is aware of the injury and its causation but fails to suspect malpractice
are infrequent. 143 Like a scalpel, its application will also be definite and precise.
Because the plaintiff bears the burden of showing due diligence in discovery 144
and because the four year period of repose serves as an absolute time barrier, 14 5
the scope of the rule is strictly limited. In view of these facts and in light of the
inequitable result that arises from a refusal to apply the rule, the North Carolina
Supreme Court made a wise and well-balanced decision to require that a plaintiff
discover wrongful conduct before the statute of limitations begins to run.
DAVID M. LEDBETrER
141. See Morgan v. Grace Hosp. Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 791-92, 144 S.E.2d 156, 161 (1965).
142. Thorpe v. DeMent, 69 N.C. App. 355, 364, 317 S.E.2d 692, 698 (Phillips, J., dissenting),
af'd, 312 N.C. 488, 322 S.E.2d 777 (1984). The absurdity of the occurrence rule also has been noted
by the Oregon Supreme Court:
To say that a cause of action accrues to a person when she may maintain an action thereon
and, at the same time, that it accrues before she has or can reasonably be expected to have
knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon her is patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She
cannot maintain an action before she knows she has one. To say to one who has been
wronged, "You had a remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law
stripped you of your remedy," makes a mockery of the law.
Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 312, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966).
143. See Dawson, 543 F. Supp. at 1338; Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708, 710 (N.D. 1983),
144. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 66.
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